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The Obama Administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on February 6, 2015. It was the second NSS document to be published by the Administration; the first was published in May 2010. The 2015 document states that its purpose is to “set out the principles and priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world.” The NSS is a congressionally mandated document, originating in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433, §603/50 U.S.C §3043).

The 2015 NSS emphasizes the role of U.S. leadership; the words “lead,” “leader,” “leading,” and “leadership” appear 94 times in the context of the U.S. role in the world. It also acknowledges national limitations and calls for strategic patience and persistence.

The 2015 report retains much of the underlying thought of the 2010 version. However, its emphasis appears to shift away from the U.S. role in the world being largely a catalyst for action by international institutions to one that reflects more involved leadership both inside those institutions and between nations.

It also takes a tougher line with both China and with Russia, while emphasizing the desirability for cooperation with both.

The 2015 report raises a number of potential oversight questions for Congress, including the following:

- Does the 2015 NSS accurately identify and properly emphasize key features and trends in the international security environment? Does it adequately address the possibility that since late 2013 a fundamental shift in the international security environment has occurred that suggests a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era to a new and different strategic situation?
- Does the 2015 NSS qualify as a true strategy in terms of linking ends (objectives), means (resources), ways (activities), and in terms of establishing priorities among goals? Is it reasonable to expect the unclassified version of an NSS to do much more than identify general objectives?
- Does the 2015 NSS properly balance objectives against available resources, particularly in the context of the limits on defense spending established in the Budget Control Act of 2011? Are Administration policies and budgets adequately aligned with the 2015 NSS?
- As part of its anticipated review of the Goldwater-Nichols act, how should Congress define its role in shaping national security strategy? Should Congress do this through an independent commission, or in some other way?
- Are NSS statements performing the function that Congress intended? How valuable to Congress are they in terms of supporting oversight of Administration policies and making resource-allocation decisions? Should the mandate that requires the Administration to submit national security strategy reports be repealed or modified? If it should be modified, what modifications should be made?
Introduction

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a congressionally mandated document, originating in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433, §603/50 U.S.C §3043). Section 3043 appears in the text box below:

§3043. Annual National Security Strategy Report

(a) Transmittal to Congress

(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a “national security strategy report”).

(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 of Title 31.

(3) Not later than 150 days after the date on which a new President takes office, the President shall transmit to Congress a national security strategy report under this section. That report shall be in addition to the report for that year transmitted at the time specified in paragraph (2).

(b) Contents

Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.

(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.

(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

(c) Classified and unclassified form

Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified and an unclassified form.

The NSS has been an unclassified document published by the President since the Reagan Administration in 1987. As such, the NSS has tended to highlight broad national security priorities of each Administration, without detailing which priorities were the highest or how, specifically, each priority would be achieved.
Key Points of the 2015 National Security Strategy

The Obama Administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on February 6, 2015. It was the second NSS document to be published by the Obama Administration; the first was published in May 2010. The 2015 document states that its purpose is to “set out the principles and priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world.”

The 2015 NSS emphasizes the role of U.S. leadership; the words “lead,” “leader,” “leading,” and “leadership” appear 94 times in the context of the U.S. role in the world. It also acknowledges national limitations and calls for strategic patience and persistence. The introduction notes:

Today’s strategic environment is fluid. Just as the United States helped shape the course of events in the last century, so must we influence their trajectory today by evolving the way we exercise American leadership. This strategy outlines priorities based on a realistic assessment of the risks to our enduring national interests and the opportunities for advancing them. This strategy eschews orienting our entire foreign policy around a single threat or region. It establishes instead a diversified and balanced set of priorities appropriate for the world’s leading global power with interests in every part of an increasingly interconnected world.

The 2015 NSS retains much of the underlying thought of the 2010 version. For example, it explicitly restates the list of “enduring national interests” from 2010:

- the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- a rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

It also retains a strong emphasis on international institutions.

Changes from the 2010 NSS

Compared with the Obama Administration’s first NSS (from 2010), the current document appears to shift emphasis in a number of areas.

The 2010 NSS framed U.S. leadership in the world in terms of “galvanizing collective action,” whereas the 2015 document frames U.S. leadership in terms of “leading with strength,” “leading by example,” “leading with capable partners,” “leading with all the instruments of U.S. power,” and “leading with a long-term perspective.” This appears to be a shift in emphasis away from the U.S. role in the world being largely a catalyst for action by international institutions to more

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involved leadership both inside those institutions and between nations. Some implications might include a more direct U.S. role in both diplomacy and potential military operations during the remainder of the Obama Administration.

The section devoted to international security in the 2010 NSS could be seen as focused on taking advantage of an improving security situation. The list of subjects in the section could be characterized as completing initiatives and actions already started and beginning a period of relative strategic calm for the United States. Its main points are for the United States to

- strengthen security and resilience at home;
- disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world;
- reverse the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and secure nuclear materials;
- advance peace, security, and opportunity in the greater Middle East;
- invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners; and
- secure cyberspace.

In the 2015 NSS, the Administration’s view of worldwide threats appears to have reflect a more turbulent world, a more challenging environment, and a perceived need for a more significant and direct leadership role for the United States than the 2010 NSS. The 2015 version’s main points in this section are for the United States to

- strengthen national defense;
- reinforce homeland security;
- combat the persistent threat of terrorism;
- build capacity to prevent conflict;
- prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction;
- confront climate change;
- ensure access to shared spaces (expanding cyberspace and including outer space and air and maritime security); and
- increase global health security.

One could argue that the points highlighted in the 2015 NSS—strengthening national defense, building capacity, ensuring access to shared spaces, and increasing global health security—envision a more active U.S. role in the world than the main points of the 2010 NSS. On the other hand, one could conclude that these, along with confronting climate change, convey both a wider range of national security challenges in terms of both the nature of the issues as well as geographic scope and the need for using the full array of policy tools.

The 2015 NSS differs from its 2010 predecessor in another area: its explanation of national priorities regarding the international order. The 2015 document lists what it terms the “rebalance”
to Asia and the Pacific as its first topic of discussion. This priority is consistent with the 2012 National Strategic Guidance, which outlined the Administration’s “shift” to the Pacific region.

The 2010 NSS, in its consideration of the international order, did not emphasize particular regions of the world. Rather, it focused on three themes, which discussed regions in a global context: (1) ensuring strong alliances, (2) building cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence, and (3) sustaining broad cooperation on key global challenges. The 2015 NSS, however, classifies the international order into discrete regional challenges:

- advance the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific;
- strengthen the enduring Alliance with Europe;
- seek stability and peace in the Middle East and North Africa;
- invest in Africa’s future; and
- deepen economic and security cooperation in the Americas.

The 2015 NSS also takes a tougher line with both China and with Russia, while emphasizing the desirability for cooperation with both. It says regarding China, “... we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.” On Russia, the document says, “... we will continue to impose significant costs on Russia through sanctions and other means while countering Moscow’s deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth. We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary.”

Views on the 2015 NSS

Some analysts have questioned whether, even with the increased emphasis on U.S. leadership, the 2015 NSS sufficiently accounts for the significant changes in strategic threats that have developed since the 2010 NSS. In particular, continued instability in the Middle East and North Africa could be perceived as conflicting with many of the underlying assumptions on worldwide security contained in the 2010 NSS. One critic notes that the 2015 NSS “reads like the drafters believed nothing much had changed, or at least whatever had changed fit rather nicely within the original framework and did not necessitate a changed strategic direction.”

On the other hand, others argue that the 2015 NSS contains a coherent philosophy and accurate assessment of the world. One analyst states, “the world of President Obama’s National Security Strategy is one in which the United States’ economic and military might serve as the bedrock of strong, participatory, and rules-based global institutions. It’s smart multilateralism—working

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within the international system while also being willing to bear the burden of defending it, although not always with military power.  

### Issues for Congress

#### Linking Goals to Resources and Activities

In basic form, a nation’s strategy is a decision on how to use national power in all its forms, including but not limited to military power. The classical statement regarding national strategy has been attributed to Carl von Clausewitz, who saw it as the use of armed force or the threat of armed force to achieve military objectives and, in extension, a war’s political purpose. Strategic thinkers in the past 50 years have expanded its definition to include the development, intellectual mastery, and utilization of all the nation’s resources for the purpose of implementing its policy in war.

Among current strategic planners and thinkers, the concept of a national strategy is the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a coordinated manner to achieve national objectives. A national strategy, in this line of thought, should articulate the “ends” (objectives) while linking them to the “means” (resources) and “ways” (activities). One example is the U.S. military’s foundational document on “Doctrine for the Armed Forces,” which states, “As a nation, the US wages war employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives.” It is this sense of achieving national objectives in conflict that distinguishes “national security strategy” from the broader “national strategy,” although the terms are often used interchangeably by many decision-makers, analysts, and pundits.

One may argue that Congress takes a significant role in deciding which means, especially in terms of resources, are to be applied to achieving the national objectives (“ends”) laid out in the NSS. From this perspective, an NSS most helpful to Congress would conceivably prioritize sets of national objectives and provide a vision of the activities (“ways”) the Administration sees in achieving those ends, as well as explicit links to the current President’s budget request for providing necessary resources.

The 2015 NSS articulates an expansive description of threats to U.S. interests and broad goals for achieving objectives across a wide range of areas and domains. As in previous NSS documents, though, it is difficult to discern how the document’s stated objectives link to resources and activities.

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Congress may wish to consider whether the 2015 NSS qualifies as a true strategy in terms of linking ends to means and ways, as well as in terms of establishing priorities among goals. It may also wish to consider whether the 2015 NSS properly balances objectives against available resources, particularly in the context of the limits on defense spending established in the Budget Control Act of 2011.

**Congressional Role**

From 1987 through 2000, a National Security Strategy was submitted every year except in 1989 and 1992. The Reagan Administration submitted two NSS reports, the George H.W. Bush Administration three, and the Clinton Administration submitted seven. The George W. Bush Administration submitted two NSSs—in September 2002 and March 2006. The Obama Administration has submitted two so far, in May 2010 and February 2015. The report has been sent to Congress 16 times since 1987 and, like the QDR, has been criticized by some analysts as having become overly influenced by political, as opposed to strategic, considerations.

Some analysts want Congress to take a greater role in reviewing U.S. national security strategy by directing a complete strategy review, perhaps as part of a retrospective on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. One option, suggested by some defense analysts, would be to establish an independent commission that would conduct a complex strategic review working from different assumptions about U.S. goals from those in the current NSS.

Another potential role for Congress involves the classification level of the NSS process. Some might argue that a mandate to make the entire NSS process classified could encourage a more frank and reliable exploration of priorities and resources. The mandate contained in Goldwater-Nichols specifies that “each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified and an unclassified form.” Recent Administrations reportedly have not produced a classified NSS.

On the other hand, classifying a major Administration statement on its view of the United States’ role in the world would likely limit debate on what the “ends” of the strategy may be and whether Congress should take a greater role in determining those aims.

**Does the 2015 NSS Adequately Reflect Recent Developments?**

According to some analysts, one difficulty faced by Administrations preparing multiple NSS reports is how to approach subsequent versions. As a public document, there may be a perceived need to emphasize continuity in assumptions and resulting policies. Some analysts have noted that both the George W. Bush Administration’s 2006 NSS and the Obama Administration’s 2015 NSS were written during times of significant flux in the international security situation, which may call into question the assumptions of each Administration’s first NSS. The 2015 NSS

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reportedly was delayed from 2013 to 2015 because world events kept rendering the latest draft obsolete.  

Other analysts have noted that the United States, especially after events in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia from 2013 to the present, may be confronting a fundamentally new international environment for the first time in many years. As stated in another CRS report,

World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security environment is undergoing a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.  

Some observers argue that the 2015 NSS explicitly mentions several major developments in the international security environment that have developed since the 2010 version: Russia’s aggression, armed conflict in Syria and Iraq, negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, instability in North Africa, and infectious disease outbreaks in Africa. Other observers, however, argue that the NSS does not explicitly take into account certain challenges to the underlying assumptions of the 2010 NSS, especially assumptions relating to the efficacy of a rules-based international order during a time of significant uncertainty and change in the fabric of the international order.  

Congress may choose to consider whether or not the 2015 NSS accurately and properly emphasizes key features and trends in the current international security environment.

Potential Oversight Questions for Congress

The 2015 NSS raises a number of potential oversight questions for Congress, including the following:

- Does the 2015 NSS accurately identify and properly emphasize key features and trends in the international security environment? Does it adequately address the possibility that since late 2013 there has been a fundamental shift in the international security environment from the familiar post-Cold War era to a new and different strategic situation?
- Does the 2015 NSS qualify as a true strategy in terms of linking ends (objectives) to means (resources) and ways (activities), and in terms of establishing priorities among goals? Is it reasonable to expect the unclassified version of an NSS to do much more than identify general objectives?
- Does the 2015 NSS properly balance objectives against available resources, particularly in the context of the limits on defense spending established in the Budget Control Act of 2011? Are Administration policies and budgets adequately

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13 Feaver, p. 1.
15 See Feaver, p. 5.
aligned with the 2015 NSS? Does the NSS establish—or does Congress otherwise have—adequate metrics for evaluating whether the strategy is being properly implemented, and whether it is achieving its stated objectives?

- The law mandating national security strategy reports directs that they be submitted annually. Why was there a five-year interval between the 2010 NSS and 2015 NSS documents? Should flux in the international security environment be a reason to expand the interval between NSS documents, or conversely, a reason to issue them more frequently?

- The law mandating national security strategy reports directs that they be submitted in both classified and unclassified form. Was the 2015 NSS submitted in classified form? If not, why not? How useful to Congress is the NSS if it is issued in unclassified form only?

- As part of its review of the Goldwater-Nichols act, should Congress undertake a review of national security strategy? If so, should Congress do this through an independent commission, or in some other way?

- Are NSS statements functioning in the way that Congress intended? How valuable to Congress are they in terms of supporting oversight of Administration policies and making resource-allocation decisions? Should the mandate that requires the Administration to submit national security strategy reports be repealed or modified? If it should be modified, what modifications should be made?

- Is the list of required reports supporting the NSS too long or redundant?

While this list of questions is aimed at congressional oversight, Congress may also consider issues associated with the 2015 NSS legislatively as part of the debate over the National Defense Authorization Act.
Appendix A. Strategic Reviews and Reports with Statutory Requirements\(^\text{16}\)

National Security Strategy (NSS)

NSS documents are issued by the President and pertain to the U.S. government as a whole.


- **Contents of the mandate:** The NSS is a report “on the national security strategy of the United States” from the President to Congress. It is required to be submitted annually on the date the President submits his annual budget request, and in addition not more than 150 days from the date a new President takes office. It must be submitted in both classified and unclassified forms. The report must address U.S. interests, goals and objectives; the policies, worldwide commitments, and capabilities required to meet those objectives; and the use of elements of national power to achieve those goals; and it must provide an assessment of associated risk.\(^\text{17}\)

- **Execution:** From 1987 through 2000, an NSS was submitted every year except in 1989 and 1992, though on various dates. The George W. Bush Administration submitted two NSSs—in September 2002 and in March 2006. The Obama Administration has submitted two so far, in May 2010 and February 2015. As a rule, recent NSS reports have described objectives and activities designed to meet those objectives; they have not as a rule directly tackled “risk”—that is, the gap between anticipated requirements and planned ability to meet them. NSSs to date have been resource-unconstrained. They have not typically prioritized among the objectives they describe, or delineated responsibilities across agencies of the U.S. government—nor are they required to do so.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) Specifically, each NSS report is required to include “a comprehensive description and discussion of the following”: “(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States. (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States. (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1). (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy. (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.” See Title 50, *U.S. Code*, §3043(b).

\(^{18}\) For example, under President George H.W. Bush, the 2002 NSS described the global strategic context, named broad goals (“political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity”), and described eight broad areas of effort designed to meet those goals. For each area, the NSS listed subset initiatives. But the NSS did not describe how those subset initiatives were to be achieved, and it did not assign responsibility for achieving them to specific agencies. Neither the eight major areas, nor the subset initiatives within each area, were (continued...)
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

Quadrennial defense reviews, required by law, are internal DOD processes designed to formulate national defense strategy and to determine the policies, approaches, and organization required to achieve that strategy, in broad support of national security strategy.19

- **Requirement:** The original QDR mandate was provided by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997, P.L. 104-201, §923. The requirement was amended and made permanent by the NDAA for FY2000, P.L. 106-65, and codified in Title 10, *U.S. Code*, §118. The mandate has been further amended by the NDAA for FY2002, FY2003, FY2007, FY2008, FY2010, and FY2012. The QDR was preceded by several other attempts to take a comprehensive look at defense strategy. These included DOD’s Base Force work, an attempt spearheaded by then-CJCS Colin Powell to define the minimum sufficient force structure for the post-Cold War era; its results were incorporated into the President’s August 1991 NSS and CJCS’s January 1992 National Military Strategy. That effort was followed by DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a “comprehensive review” of “defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations,” launched by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin that built on his work from his previous role as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.20

(...continued)
**Contents of the mandate:** The QDR itself is a review process, required to be conducted during the first year of every presidential administration. The review is required to take a 20-year outlook and to be resource-unconstrained. The process is required to “delineate a national defense strategy”; to determine the force structure, modernization plans, and infrastructure required to implement that strategy; and to craft an associated budget plan. The Secretary of Defense is required to deliver a report based on the review to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees the year following the year in which the QDR is conducted, no later than the date on which the President delivers his budget request to Congress. Legislation does not specify a classification level for the report. The report is required to address 16 specific points, including the results of the review, as well as any other items the Secretary deems appropriate.

(...continued)

Specifically, the review is required (1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to §108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Title 50 U.S. Code §404a); (2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with that national defense strategy that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy; (3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and (4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to §1105 of Title 31 U.S. Code. See §118(b) Title 10, U.S. Code.

21 Specifically, the review is required (1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to §108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Title 50 U.S. Code §404a); (2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with that national defense strategy that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy; (3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and (4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to §1105 of Title 31 U.S. Code. See §118(b) Title 10, U.S. Code.

22 Specifically, the review is required to include “(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States, the strategic planning guidance, and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk. (2) The assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review. (3) The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats. (4) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to (A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations; (C) warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; (E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies; and (F) the roles and responsibilities that would be discharged by contractors. (5) The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies. (6) The manpower, sustainment, and contractor support policies required under the national defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120 days. (7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions. (8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the “tooth-to-tail” ratio) under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies, and the scope of contractor support, for that purpose. (9) The specific capabilities, including the general number and type of specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the review. (10) The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support the national defense strategy. (11) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts. (12) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters. (13) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy. (14) The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years. (15) The national defense mission of the Coast Guard. (16) The homeland defense and support to (continued...)
• **Execution:** To date, each QDR report has been submitted to Congress as required—in 1997, 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Substantive compliance has arguably been mixed, depending on how much detail one believes is required to meet congressional intent. For example, while QDR reports all address some capability requirements, they rarely if ever specify the “number and type of specific military platforms.” QDR reports typically do not prioritize among defense objectives or specifically delineate roles and responsibilities within DOD.

**National Defense Strategy (NDS)**

National defense strategy articulates the ends that DOD will pursue to help execute the national security strategy, together with the ways and means that DOD will use to do so.

• **Requirement:** Title 10, U.S. Code, §118 requires that the QDR process “delineate a national defense strategy” and that the QDR report include a “comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States.” There is no separate statutory mandate for an NDS.

• **Contents of the mandate:** Section 118 requires that the NDS—as part of the QDR report—be submitted to Armed Services Committees every four years, no later than the President’s budget submission. There is no statutory description of the discrete contents of defense strategy, but Section 118 requires that it be consistent with the most recent NSS.

• **Execution:** The 1997, 2001, and 2014 QDR reports each explicitly included section on a national defense strategy. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs did not. Instead, DOD issued stand-alone NDSs in 2005 and 2008. In addition, on
January 5, 2012, DOD issued “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” commonly referred to as the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). Many have raised questions about the DSG’s continued pertinence, since it explicitly did not account for the pressures on the defense budget associated with sequestration-level topline budget caps.

National Military Strategy (NMS)

In general, national military strategy concerns the organized application of military means in support of broader national (political) goals.

- **Requirement**: The NDAA for FY2004, P.L. 108-136, §903, introduced a permanent requirement for an NMS, codified in Title 10, *U.S. Code*, §153(b), as amended by the NDAA for FY2012 and FY2013. While no explicit permanent mandate for an NMS was enacted until 2003, the general need for a military strategy was recognized in both law and practice much earlier. Title 10, *U.S. Code*, §153(a), as introduced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, assigns responsibility to CJCS for “assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces.” In the early 1990s, Congress enacted a temporary NMS requirement; §1032 of the NDAA for FY1991, P.L. 101-510, required CJCS to submit to the Secretary of Defense a strategic military plan, in both classified and unclassified form, by the first day of September 2002. It directly informed the 2006 QDR Report, which echoed the NDS’s four global security challenges. See Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf. The 2008 NDS began by stating that it “flows from the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy,” “provides a framework for other DoD strategic guidance,” and “reflects the results of the 2006 QDR,” pp. 1-2. It largely retained the fundamental concerns about the global security environment that had underpinned the 2005 NDS and the 2006 QDR—violent extremism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of major powers such as China and Russia, and the unpredictability of “rogue” states such as Iran and North Korea. It formulated these concerns in terms of five “objectives”: “defend the homeland; win the long war; promote security; deter conflict; and win our nation’s wars.” It prescribed five lines of effort designed to achieve these objectives: “shaping the choices of key states; preventing adversaries from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction; strengthening and expanding Alliances and partnerships; securing U.S. strategic access and retaining freedom of action; and integrating and unifying our efforts.” See Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf.

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26 The DSG emphasized a shift in overall focus from winning today’s wars to preparing for future challenges; a shift in geographical priorities toward the Asia Pacific region while retaining emphasis on the Middle East; a shift in the balance of missions toward more emphasis on projecting power in areas in which U.S. access and freedom to operate are challenged by asymmetric means and less emphasis on stabilization operations, while retaining a full-spectrum force; a corresponding shift in force structure, including reductions in Army and Marine Corps endstrength, toward a smaller, more agile force including the ability to mobilize quickly, and a corresponding shift toward advanced capabilities including Special Operations Forces, new technologies such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and unmanned systems, and cyberspace capabilities. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. For an overview and analysis, see CRS Report R42146, Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG): In Brief, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.


Each calendar year from 1991 through 1993. Each plan would address three different scenarios based on specified strategic contexts and fiscal constraints. For each scenario, the plan would address strategic threats, the requirements for meeting those threats, the roles and missions of the military services, and force structure. In turn, the Secretary of Defense was required to forward each plan to Congress—during fiscal years 1992, 1993, and 1994, respectively—together with his comments and recommendations. Before that time, it had been common practice for CJCS to craft a classified NMS as a vehicle for advising the Secretary and the President. After the expiration of the temporary mandate, CJCS issued unclassified NMSs in 1995 and 1997.29

- **Contents of the mandate:** CJCS is required, every two years, to determine whether to prepare a new NMS or to update the previous one; and to submit the new NMS or update, through the Secretary of Defense, to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees by February 15 of each even-numbered year. The legislation does not prescribe the classification level. The NMS is required to be consistent with the most recent NSS, the most recent QDR, and with “any other national security or defense strategic guidance issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense.” Each NMS is required to address strategic challenges and opportunities; U.S. military objectives; the missions and activities required to accomplish those objectives; force planning and sizing; contributions from interagency and international partners and from contractors, and resource constraints that affect the strategy.30 The Secretary is required to include with the strategy transmittal any comments the Secretary considers appropriate.

- **Execution:** The first NMS issued on the basis of the permanent requirement was the 2004 National Military Strategy. It stated that it “supports the aims of the National Security Strategy and implements the National Defense Strategy.” While it was issued in advance of the March 2005 NDS, key concepts in both

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30 In particular, Title 10, *U.S. Code* §153(b)(1)(D) requires that each NMS identify “(i) the United States military objectives and the relationship of those objectives to the strategic environment and to the threats required to be described under subparagraph (E); (ii) the operational concepts, missions, tasks, or activities necessary to support the achievement of the objectives identified under clause (i); (iii) the fiscal, budgetary, and resource environments and conditions that, in the assessment of the Chairman, affect the strategy; and (iv) the assumptions made with respect to each of clauses (i) through (iii).” §153(b)(1)(E) requires that each NMS include a description of: “(i) the strategic environment and the opportunities and challenges that affect United States national interests and United States national security; (ii) the threats, such as international, regional, transnational, hybrid, terrorism, cyber attack, weapons of mass destruction, asymmetric challenges, and any other categories of threats identified by the Chairman, to the United States national security; (iii) the implications of current force planning and sizing constructs for the strategy; (iv) the capacity, capabilities, and availability of United States forces (including both the active and reserve components) to support the execution of missions required by the strategy; (v) areas in which the armed forces intends to engage and synchronize with other departments and agencies of the United States Government contributing to the execution of missions required by the strategy; (vi) areas in which the armed forces could be augmented by contributions from alliances (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), international allies, or other friendly nations in the execution of missions required by the strategy; (vii) the requirements for operational contractor support to the armed forces for conducting security force assistance training, peacekeeping, overseas contingency operations, and other major combat operations under the strategy; and (viii) the assumptions made with respect to each of clauses (i) through (vii).”
strategies were developed in tandem, for example the “four strategic challenges”—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. The subsequent, and most recent, NMS was issued in 2011, following the release of both an NSS and a QDR report in 2010.

Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM)

While mandates have varied over time, both law and practice have long recognized the potential value of a rigorous assessment of roles and missions within DOD.

- **Requirement:** The permanent statutory requirement for a separate QRM review by the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with CJCS, is found in Title 10, U.S. Code, §118b, as amended by §941 of the NDAA for FY2008, P.L. 110-181. An earlier requirement for a roles and missions review by CJCS was created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, §201, which amended Title 10, U.S. Code to include the requirement, in §153(b), that CICS provide the Secretary of Defense a report on the assignment of roles and missions to the armed forces. The report was to be produced not less than once every three years, or at the request of the President or the Secretary. It was to take into account threats, changes in technology, and the need to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort. There was no requirement to submit the report to Congress. The NDAA for FY2001, P.L. 107-107, preserved the premise that CJCS should assess roles and missions but made that responsibility part of the Chairman’s assessment of the QDR—thus mandating that the assessment be quadrennial rather than triennial, and that its results be presented to Congress (as part of the QDR submission).

- **Contents of the mandate:** The current QRM mandate requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with CJCS, to conduct a roles and missions review every four years, and to submit a report based on the review to the Armed Services Committees no later than the submission of the President’s budget request, in February of the following year. As part of the review, the Secretary is required to identify the “core mission areas” of the armed forces, the capabilities required to perform those missions, the assignment of responsibility within DOD for providing those capabilities, and any gaps or unnecessary duplication of effort. The Secretary is required to base those findings in part on the results of a


[33] §921(a) of the NDAA for FY2002, P.L. 107-107, amended §118 of Title 10, U.S. Code—which provided the permanent requirement for a QDR as introduced by the NDAA for FY2000, P.L. 106-65—but adding to §118(e), which requires CJCS to provide an assessment of the QDR, the requirement that CJCS include in that work an assessment of the roles and missions of the armed forces, giving particular consideration to duplication of effort and changes in technology. P.L. 107-107 §921(b) eliminated redundancy by amending §153(b) of Title 10, U.S. Code, to strike the requirement for a triennial report on the assignment of roles and missions. The NDAA for FY2008, P.L. 110-181, the basis for the current QRM requirement, also prevented redundancy by striking the roles and missions assessment requirement in §118(e) of Title 10, U.S. Code, when it created §118b.

[34] Specifically, the Secretary is required to identify “(1) the core mission areas of the armed forces; (2) the core (continued...)
separate, independent military review of roles and missions conducted by CJCS. P.L. 110-181 §941(c) required that the first QRM under this mandate be conducted in 2008, and that subsequent QRMs be conducted every four years beginning in 2011.

- **Execution:** To date, DOD has complied with QRM-mandated timelines, submitting the first report in 2009 and the second in 2012. Some observers suggested that the 2012 QRM report—compared with its 2009 predecessor—reflected a certain lack of rigor, not least because the 2012 report appeared to pull most of its contents directly from the 2012 DSG. The next QRM report is due to Congress in 2016. Some observers have raised questions about the division of labor, in theory and in practice, between the QRM and the QDR. Statutory requirements space QRM execution and submission squarely in the middle of the QDR cycle. In theory, DOD’s “core missions,” as laid out in the QRM, might be derived from the assessment of the strategic landscape and DOD’s strategy for meeting its challenges, as laid out in the QDR and its built-in NDS. As long as the basic premises of the defense strategy still hold, which is by no means a given, a two-year gap between adjudication of defense strategy, and assessment of the appropriateness of the assignment of roles and missions for executing that strategy, might in principle allow sufficient time to gauge the effectiveness of the division of labor. However, the practice of de-linking the NDS from the QDR might distort the logic of that timeline somewhat.

**Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA)**

Formal strategy-making and planning both include, by definition, a consideration of “risk”—the gap between what the strategy or plan is designed to accomplish and what it would take to fully meet identified challenges. Statute requires that CJCS regularly assess the risk associated with the NMS.

- **Requirement:** The permanent requirement for a CRA is codified in Title 10, U.S. Code, §153(b). The original requirement was introduced by the NDAA for FY2000, P.L. 106-65, §1033, which amended Title 10, U.S. Code, §153, adding the requirement that CJCS, not later than January 1 each year, submit to the Secretary of Defense “a report providing the Chairman’s assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the current national military strategy.” The Secretary

(...continued)

competencies and capabilities that are associated with the performance or support of a core mission area identified pursuant to paragraph (1); (3) the elements of the Department of Defense (including any other office, agency, activity, or command described in section 111(b) of this title) that are responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities required to effectively perform the core missions identified pursuant to paragraph (1); (4) any gaps in the ability of the elements (or other office, agency activity, or command) of the Department of Defense to provide core competencies and capabilities required to effectively perform the core missions identified pursuant to paragraph (1); (5) any unnecessary duplication of core competencies and capabilities between defense components; and (6) a plan for addressing any gaps or unnecessary duplication identified pursuant to paragraph (4) or paragraph (5).” See Title 10, U.S. Code, §118b(c).

The creation of a requirement to address risk associated with the NMS actually pre-dated the permanent statutory requirement for an NMS itself by several years, although it was already established practice for the CJCS to craft an NMS. The NDAA for FY2003, P.L. 107-314, redesignated the CRA provision as §153(b), and the NDAA for FY2004, P.L. 108-136, made the mandate biennial by substituting “each odd-numbered year” for the previous annual submission requirement. The NDAA for FY2012, P.L. 112-81, §941, refined the content of the CRA; and the NDAA for FY2013, P.L. 112-239, §952, substantially reorganized §153 of Title 10, U.S. Code, changed the CRA back to an annual requirement, and significantly revised the required contents of the NMS as well as of the CRA.

- Contents of the mandate: By current mandate, CJCS is required, every year, to prepare an assessment of risks associated with the most current NMS (or update), and to submit that assessment, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Armed Services Committees, no later than February 15. The CRA must address strategic risks to U.S. interests, and military risks to executing the missions required by the NMS, distinguishing as it does so between the probability and severity of those risks. It must give attention to fiscal constraints and address anticipated contributions by others including other U.S. agencies, international partners, and contractors. The Secretary is required to produce and submit to Congress, with the CRA, a risk mitigation plan (RMP) that addresses any “significant” risks identified by the CRA. The RMP must include steps designed to mitigate the risks, and it must describe the extent to which, and the timeline by which, it is anticipated that the risks will be mitigated.

36 Specifically, the CRA is required to do the following: “(i) As the Chairman considers appropriate, update any changes to the strategic environment, threats, objectives, force planning and sizing constructs, assessments, and assumptions that informed the National Military Strategy required by this section. (ii) Identify and define the strategic risks to United States interests and the military risks in executing the missions of the National Military Strategy. (iii) Identify and define levels of risk distinguishing between the concepts of probability and consequences, including an identification of what constitutes “significant” risk in the judgment of the Chairman. (iv)(I) Identify and assess risk in the National Military Strategy by category and level and the ways in which risk might manifest itself, including how risk is projected to increase, decrease, or remain stable over time; and (II) for each category of risk, assess the extent to which current or future risk increases, decreases, or is stable as a result of budgetary priorities, tradeoffs, or fiscal constraints or limitations as currently estimated and applied in the most current future-years defense program under section 221 of this title. (v) Identify and assess risk associated with the assumptions or plans of the National Military Strategy about the contributions or support of (I) other departments and agencies of the United States Government (including their capabilities and availability); (II) alliances, allies, and other friendly nations (including their capabilities, availability, and interoperability); and (III) contractors. (vi) Identify and assess the critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistics, intelligence, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of the contingency plans of each unified combatant command, and identify and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths for the National Military Strategy.” See Title 10, U.S. Code, §153(b)(2)(B).

37 Specifically, each RMP must “(i) address the risk assumed in the National Military Strategy (or update) concerned, and the additional actions taken or planned to be taken to address such risk using only current technology and force structure capabilities; and (ii) specify, for each risk addressed, the extent of, and a schedule for expected mitigation of, such risk, and an assessment of the potential for residual risk, if any, after mitigation.” See Title 10, U.S. Code, §153(b)(4)(B).

• **Execution:** Over the past decade, as statutory requirements regarding CRA submission timelines were adjusted several times, DOD has submitted CRAs to Congress frequently, if not always in compliance with the current mandate at the time. The most recent CRA was submitted in February 2015. All have been submitted in classified format, although the legislation does not specify a classification level. In substance, CRAs have defined the statutory categories of strategic and military risk in somewhat varied ways, with some apparent impact on the issues selected for inclusion. The RMPs, as a rule, have struggled to distinguish between “risks”—that is, the gaps, given existing threats to national security, between what it would take to meet those threats and current capacity and capabilities for doing so—and simple “threats”; and thus the plans for “risk mitigation” have more typically been, instead, descriptions of ways and means designed to meet threats.

**National Defense Panel (NDP)**

Many practitioners and observers have suggested the value of a competition of ideas, to spur the rigor and creativity of any strategic review process. Such a competition may be internal or external—aimed respectively at improving the process itself or at fostering a robust debate that weighs the findings of the process against alternatives. The current NDP requirement is the most recent expression of congressional interest in fostering a competition of ideas associated with the QDR.

• **Requirement:** The current statutory mandate for the NDP is found in Title 10 U.S. Code, §118(f), as amended most recently by §1071 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011, P.L. 111-383. This mandate borrows its name and broad intent from a series of prior requirements. The original requirement for an NDP was introduced by §923 and §924 of the NDAA for FY1997, P.L. 104-201, which also created the initial, one-time requirement for the 1997 QDR. That law called for a one-time “nonpartisan, independent” panel of universally recognized senior defense experts to do a mid-course assessment of the DOD QDR process; to provide an assessment of DOD’s review upon completion; and to conduct an “alternative force structure assessment.” The permanent requirement for a QDR assessment panel dates to 2006. In the wake of the 2006 QDR process, Congress, in the John Warner NDAA for FY2007, P.L. 109-364, §1031, amended Title 10 U.S. Code, §118, to revive the basic premise of the NDP. The provision created a permanent mandate for a QDR independent panel (QDRIP) to conduct an “assessment of the [QDR] review, including the recommendations of the review, the stated and implied assumptions incorporated in the review, and the vulnerabilities of the strategy and force structure underlying the review.” In the NDAA for FY2010, P.L. 111-84, §1061, Congress, without amending Title 10, provided one-time guidance, regarding panel membership and duties, for the work of the QDRIP in support of the 2010 QDR process. In terms of substance, the QDRIP was tasked that year to review the Secretary’s terms of reference; assess the assumptions, strategy, findings and risks in the QDR report; conduct an independent assessment of possible force structures; and compare the resource requirements of its own alternative force structures with the QDR’s budget plan.

• **Contents of the mandate:** The current NDP mandate flows directly from that legislative history. In the Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011, P.L. 111-383, §1071,
Congress amended Title 10, *U.S. Code*, §118(f), regarding the QDRIP. It renamed the panel the National Defense Panel. And it incorporated key provisions, including the panel’s mandate, from the FY2010 NDAA one-time mandate regarding the role of the QDRIP in the 2010 QDR process.\(^{38}\) By statute, the NDP must be established no later than February 1 of any year in which a QDR process is conducted. The NDP must include 10 members total—2 each appointed by the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the two Armed Services Committees, and 2 by the Secretary of Defense. And the NDP must submit its findings to the Armed Services Committees no later than three months after the date of the QDR’s submission.

- **Execution:** The original NDP, constituted to support the 1997 QDR, did not meet the requirements specified by law. It found itself unable to conduct a full alternative assessment, and it did not attempt to evaluate the work of the formal QDR process. Instead, it crafted an alternative conceptual approach—the need for “transformation” as the foundation for determining future force structure.\(^{39}\)

  The QDRIP, to support the 2010 QDR, completed its final report in July 2010 and presented its findings to Congress in a public forum shortly thereafter. Rather than grade the homework of the 2010 QDR, per se, the QDRIP critically assessed the conduct of QDRs since their inception, and it called for the discontinuation of the QDR process in favor of normal DOD planning cycles and a proposed new interagency-level strategic planning process. The QDRIP did provide its own alternative strategic assessment and force structure recommendation as required by law; it did not provide the required comparative cost estimates.\(^{40}\)

  The most current NDP was published in July 2014, to support the 2014 QDR.\(^{41}\)

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**Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)**

The U.S. government’s homeland security architecture was created in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The QHSR (“kisser” in common parlance), modeled explicitly on DOD’s QDR, was part of that set of changes.

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38 Specifically, the NDP is required to “(i) review the Secretary of Defense’s terms of reference and any other materials providing the basis for, or substantial inputs to, the work of the Department of Defense on the quadrennial defense review; (ii) conduct an assessment of the assumptions, strategy, findings, and risks of the report on the quadrennial defense review required in subsection (d), with particular attention paid to the risks described in that report; (iii) conduct an independent assessment of a variety of possible force structures of the armed forces, including the force structure identified in the report on the quadrennial defense review required in subsection (d); (iv) review the resource requirements identified pursuant to subsection (b)(3) and, to the extent practicable, make a general comparison to the resource requirements to support the forces contemplated under the force structures assessed under this subparagraph; and (v) provide to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, through the report under paragraph (7), any recommendations it considers appropriate for their consideration.” See Title 10, *U.S. Code*, §118(f)(5)(B).


**Contents of the mandate:** Statute requires that every four years, beginning in FY2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security conduct a “review of the homeland security of the nation.” The review must be conducted in consultation with a number of specified governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The review must delineate a national homeland security strategy; outline and prioritize missions; describe interagency cooperation and preparedness; identify the budget plan required; assess organizational alignment; and assess the procedures of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for acquisition and expenditure. The legislation does not specifically require the QHSR to be consistent with the current National Security Strategy, but the requirement for consistency with “appropriate national and Department strategies” might be understood to include the NSS. The legislation does require, however, that the QHSR be consistent with the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The Secretary must submit a

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42 Specifically, these include “the heads of other Federal agencies, including the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Director of National Intelligence; key officials of the Department of Homeland Security; and other relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities, including state, local, and tribal government officials, Members of Congress, private sector representatives, academics, and other policy experts.” See Title 6, *U.S. Code*, §347(a)(3).

43 Specifically, in each review, the Secretary of Homeland Security is required to “(1) delineate and update, as appropriate, the national homeland security strategy, consistent with appropriate national and Department strategies, strategic plans, and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, including the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Response Plan, and the Department Security Strategic Plan; (2) outline and prioritize the full range of the critical homeland security mission areas of the Nation; (3) describe the interagency cooperation, preparedness of Federal response assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the homeland security program and policies of the Nation associated with the national homeland security strategy, required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in the national homeland security strategy described in paragraph (1) and the homeland security mission areas outlined under paragraph (2); (4) identify the budget plan required to provide sufficient resources to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in the national homeland security strategy described in paragraph (1) and the homeland security mission areas outlined under paragraph (2); (5) include an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the national homeland security strategy referred to in paragraph (1) and the homeland security mission areas outlined under paragraph (2); and (6) review and assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms of the Department for executing the process of turning the requirements developed in the quadrennial homeland security review into an acquisition strategy and expenditure plan within the Department.” See Title 6, *U.S. Code*, §347(b).

report based on the review to Congress by December 31 of the year in which the QHSR is conducted. The report is to be unclassified, and DHS is further instructed to make the report publicly available on its website.

- **Execution:** Two QHSR reports have been required. The first QHSR report, submitted to Congress in 2010, included a striking disclaimer up front: “The report is not a resource prioritization document, although in identifying key mission areas for priority focus, it is highly indicative of where those priorities should lie. Nor does the QHSR detail the roles and responsibilities of Federal or other institutions for each mission area.”\(^45\) The most recent QHSR was submitted in June 2014.\(^46\)

(...continued)


Appendix B. Selected Strategic Reviews and Reports Without Statutory Requirements

Departments, agencies, and the executive branch as a whole may conduct strategic reviews and craft strategic guidance apart from any congressional mandate. Such efforts have the potential to contribute constructively to U.S. national security efforts, but they may, however, raise questions for Congress concerning whether and how to provide oversight.

Department of Defense Comprehensive Review

DOD’s 2011 comprehensive review was reportedly driven by both strategic and budgetary imperatives. Falling under the auspices of two consecutive Secretaries of Defense, Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, the review went by several different names rather than a single acronym.

- **Requirement:** While DOD’s 2011 comprehensive review had no explicit statutory mandate, executive and legislative branch actions variously prompted or catalyzed the conduct of the review. In April 2011, President Obama directed DOD to identify $400 billion in “additional savings” in the defense budget, as part of a broader effort to achieve $4 trillion in deficit reduction over 12 years.\(^48\) DOD’s efforts to comply with that guidance received an additional jumpstart from the enactment, in August 2011, of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), P.L. 112-25, which established topline budget caps.\(^49\)

- **Contents of the mandate:** The mandate for the comprehensive review explicitly included strategy as well as resources. President Obama indicated from the outset that the search for savings should be driven by strategic considerations, calling for “a fundamental review of America’s missions, capabilities, and our role in a changing world.”\(^50\) In May 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Gates, accepting the assignment from the President, stressed that DOD’s review would help “ensure that future spending decisions are focused on priorities, strategy, and risks, and

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\(^{47}\) Written by Catherine Dale, then CRS Specialist in International Security, and excerpted from CRS Report R43174, *National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress*.


\(^{49}\) See the Budget Control Act of 2011, P.L. 112-25, §101 and §302, which amended §251 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, P.L. 99-177. DOD efforts to meet the presidential and the BCA targets were preceded by a relatively rigorous internal effort to reduce overhead launched by Secretary Gates in spring 2010. The results of that “efficiencies” scrub were announced on January 6, 2011, and then reflected in the defense budget request for FY2012. They included $100 billion in savings over the FYDP identified by military services, which services were allowed to keep and reinvest in priority programs; and $78 billion in DOD-wide savings over the FYDP, which DOD stated that it would use to accommodate a lower budget topline. It should be noted that there may be a difference between “savings identified in advance” and “savings realized.” See Office of the USD (Comptroller), United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request, Overview, February 2011, paragraph 5-1.


are not simply a math and accounting exercise.”

And in August 2011, new Secretary of Defense Panetta confirmed that DOD was implementing the President’s April guidance by conducting a “fundamental review.” He added that key questions in the review included “What are the essential missions our military must do to protect America and our way of life? What are the risks of the strategic choices we make? What are the financial costs?”

• **Execution:** Publicly and privately, DOD officials confirmed that based on the President’s guidance, DOD launched a robust, senior-level review process that gave some consideration to strategic imperatives and involved iterative engagement with the White House. According to DOD officials, the results were manifested in the January 2012 DSG and in the defense budget request for FY2013.

**Department of Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR)**

The SCMR (“skimmer” in common parlance), like the comprehensive review, was an internally driven exercise nominally concerned with both strategy and resourcing.

• **Requirement:** The SCMR had no external mandate. Instead, it was conducted based on direction given by new Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in March 2013, not long after he assumed office.

• **Contents of the mandate:** Secretary Hagel assigned responsibility for the conduct of the SCMR to Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in coordination with the Joint Staff, and established a deadline for completion of May 31, 2013. OSD CAPE (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) was given day-to-day management responsibility for the effort, and the process, like recent QDR processes, was designed to be participatory. A number of participants later suggested that the SCMR was fundamentally budget-driven—designed to examine, in Deputy Secretary Carter’s words, “every nickel” that DOD spends. DOD officials indicated that the review would be used to inform revisions to the FY2014 defense request should sequestration continue; to inform the fiscal guidance given to military services as they build their FY2015 and associated five-year budget plans; and to serve as the anchor for the 2014 QDR process. According to DOD officials, the SCMR considered three potential budget scenarios: the President’s FY2014 budget, the BCA’s sequester-level topline caps, and an “in-between” scenario. The review examined three substantive areas—

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- **Execution:** DOD concluded the SCMR on schedule, briefed the results to President Obama, and then briefed the major conclusions to Congress and also to the public. DOD officials noted that the SCMR took the 2012 DSG as its baseline. Yet the tenor of the July 31 roll-out and associated discussions underscored that the primary focus of the review was budgetary—“the purpose” of the SCMR “was to understand the impact of further budget reductions on the Department, and develop options to deal with these additional cuts.” The SCMR concluded that even the most drastic options under consideration in all three categories—efficiencies, compensation, and force structure/modernization—could help DOD meet sequester-level topline caps only toward the end of the BCA’s 10-year application. DOD officials stressed that the SCMR generated ideas not decisions—it would be the 2014 QDR process, they argued, that would help DOD make tough strategic choices, and those choices would require, as a prerequisite, further clarity about fiscal constraints. Some DOD officials and outside observers have suggested that at some unspecified point of increased austerity, it becomes time to reconsider both the most fundamental aims that defense strategy seeks to realize, and the role that the U.S. intends to play on the world stage.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)**

In 2010, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development issued the first—and to date only—QDDR report, based on a robust internal review process that broadly echoed the QDR process.

- **Requirement:** There was no external mandate for the QDDR. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton directed the State Department to conduct the review.

- **Contents of the mandate:** The QDDR process was explicitly based on the QDR and the QHSR. It was designed to consider priorities, resourcing, and organization.
The QDDR report was issued in December 2010 as an unclassified public document. It explicitly proposed a reform agenda, calling for specific changes in both the focus and the organizational structure of the State Department. The QDDR report described the 2010 NSS as an overall “blueprint,” and specifically invoked a number of its concepts, including “smart power” and its approach toward development.57 State Department officials have suggested that there are no immediate plans to conduct a second QDDR.58

Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR)

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the national intelligence architecture—like that for homeland security—was overhauled, through legislation and presidential directives.59 None of this guidance explicitly included a requirement for an intelligence strategy or a formal review, but the advent of the QICR (“quicker” in common parlance) may be considered a reflection of broadly shared interest, post-9/11, in improving the ways in which intelligence supports national security writ large. The lack of an external mandate for the QICR and the classification of most of its outputs may be responsible for the relative lack of attention that has been paid to the QICR, compared to its quadrennial counterparts, in the national security debates.

Requirement: The QICR does not have a statutory mandate, but Congress has shown interest in the possible creation of such a mandate. In its Report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2006, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that the Director of National Intelligence develop a “formalized, periodic, and structured” quadrennial intelligence review modeled on the QDR.60 There is also no statutory mandate for a national intelligence strategy (NIS) that might serve as a conceptual umbrella for a more detailed QICR. However, two NISs have been issued in recent years,

58 Interviews with State officials, 2013.
60 See H.Rept. 109-101, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2006, June 2, 2005, to accompany H.R. 2475. The committee further proposed that the review “identify the breadth and depth of the threats, the capabilities existing and needed to combat those threats, and better identify the alignment of resources, authorities, and personnel needed to support those required capabilities.” The review would be used, in turn, to help the Director of National Intelligence “develop and periodically adjust a national intelligence strategy.” That strategy “would inform the types of information needed to support national priorities and objectives,” which in turn would facilitate determination “about which intelligence discipline, or disciplines, can best provide the required information.” Those decisions, in turn, “would inform guidance regarding capabilities development and allocation of funding among intelligence disciplines.” The act was not enacted.
in 2005 and in 2009, by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), addressing both mission and organization.61

**Contents of the mandate:** QICR mandates are not statutory and do not appear to be publicly available. However, the basic quadrennial timeline, and the broad notion of considering the link between strategy and resourcing over a relatively long time frame, follow the basic contours of the QDR.

**Execution:** QICRs have been conducted in 2001, 2005, and 2009. The first two produced classified outcomes. The third was a scenario-based exercise, looking out to 2025, which considered an array of alternative futures and the missions that would be required to address them. The 2009 QICR unclassified report merely described the scenarios; a separate, classified QICR Final Report reportedly addressed the implications of those scenarios for missions and capabilities.62

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